无忧论文网

Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure

背景：

日期：2009-7-14	作者：Michael C.Jensen William H. Meckling	编辑：anne	点击次数：15
销售价格：100元	论文编号：lw200907141430245944	论文字数：5156
论文属性：硕士课程论文	论文地区：英国	论文语种：English
说明：支付后，我们将在24小时内发到您的邮箱，请支付后通知我们发送论文，谢谢。

收藏：del.icio.us google书签 雅虎搜藏 百度搜藏 新浪vivi 和讯网摘poco网摘天极网摘qq书签饭否mister-wong365网摘LiveDiggDiglog

关键词：Agency costs and theory internal control systems conflicts of interest capital structure internal equity outside equity 英国论文 硕士课程论文

Abstract：This paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. We define the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the ‘separation and control’ issue, investigate the nature of the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and outside equity, demonstrate who bears costs and why, and investigate the Pareto optimality of their existence. We also provide a new definition of the firm, and show how our analysis of the factors influencing the creation and issuance of debt and equity claims is a special case of the supply side of the completeness of markets problem.
The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it.Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.

1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation of the Paper
1.2 Theory of the Firm: An Empty Box?
1.3 Property Rights
1.4 Agency Costs
1.5 General Comments on the Definition of the firm
.............................................................
2. The Agency Costs of Outside Equity
2.1 Overview
........................................................
3. Some unanswered questions regarding the existence of the corporate form
3.1 The question
.............................................
4. The Agency Costs of Debt
......................................
5. A Theory of the Corporate Ownership Structure
...............................................
5.5 Determination of the Optimal Scale of the Firm
6. Qualifications and Extensions of the Analysis
6.1 Multiperiod aspects of the agency problem
.......................................................
6.7 The Supply Side of the Incomplete Markets Question
7. Conclusions
References 本论文由无忧论文网www.51lunwen.com整理提供

  
支付后，我们将在24小时内发到您的邮箱，请支付后通知我们发送论文，谢谢。
houqinzhichi@qq.com QQ:951300497 购买论文，汇款确认信邮箱。