摘 要

在企业所有权和经营权分离的今天，各个国家的企业中都活跃着，果敢敏捷、运筹帷幄的职业经理人，他们代替股东行使企业资产管理权，在企业的经济生活中发挥着巨大的作用。无论是关于职业经理人的论题，还是关于一般意义上的激励问题的研究，不仅在经济学中，而且在管理学中，都有着十分重要的地位。目前我国对职业经理人激励约束问题的研究还是处于探索时期，相当多的激励模式是大多照搬国外已经实践的模式如股票期权、年薪制等，由于我国公司治理结构和法律环境以及市场经济的特点，以上激励方式在我国企业的实施中存在许多的障碍并且效果并不理想。在建立适应我国经济发展特色的职业经理人激励约束机制方面理论界还未达成共识，实际应用当中有效的激励方案也较少。因此，对我国职业经理人的激励问题需要投入更多的精力进一步探讨。本文围绕职业经理人激励这个主题，首先深入分析了股票期权激励约束机制的理论基础和借鉴国内外已有的理论，然后针对股票期权本身理论上的缺陷和目前我国实施股票期权激励机制的诸多障碍，并引入了EVA 指标并对其不足进行修正，克服了原始方案的弊端和增强了对职业经理人的激励约束效果，最后提出了基于EVA的虚拟股票期权激励机制的解决方案。

关键词: EVA，职业经理人，虚拟股票期权，激励约束机制

Abstract

Today, every business enterprise from different countries, separated in ownership and the management power, There are many professional executives who are courageous & nimble, devising strategies within a command tent, and they replace the shareholders to exercise property management power in the business enterprises, developing a huge function in the economic life of business enterprises. Not only the theories concerning the professional executives but also the incentive research from the general meaning are all very important in the management.
Currently, the research on the incentive and restraining problems of professional executives in our country is still be placed into the investigating period, and a nice bit of incentive modes，such as stock options, yearly salary system, etc, mostly无忧论文 【http://www.uklunwen.com】 moved from the foreign practiced modes, exist many obstacles and no ideal results when implement in our business enterprises, this partly because of the characteristics of managing structure and law environment in the companies as well as the market economy in our country. The theorists haven't reached a consensus in the aspects of building up the incentive mechanism of the professional executives, which will adapt China to its special features in the economic development, and the effective incentive modes are less in the practical applications.
Therefore, we should put more energies into the further research on the incentive and restraining problems of professional executives in our country. Centering on the subject of incentive professional executives, firstly, this paper profoundly analyzes on the theories foundation of the incentive and restraining mechanism and draws lessons from the theories which have already had at home and abroad, secondly, aiming at the theoretical defects the stock option itself has and many obstacles of currently incentive mechanism implement in China’s stock options, as well as leading into the EVA index to correct its shortage, this paper overcomes the irregularity of the original project and strengthens the incentive and restraining results to the professional executives, and at last, it puts forward the solutions according to the EVA phantom stock options incentive mechanism.

Keywords: EVA，Professional Executive，Phantom Stock